Rubinstein gets it wrong on how Race Hate laws work…

August 8, 2009

Colin Rubinstein was a pleasant enough fellow when I knew him back in my Monash days. He was an academic in the Politics Department ( I think).  A man of very strong views but, in the main,  quite logical.  His latest offerings to the Age, Terrorist television would violate our racial hatred laws,is anything but.  His views are still strongly held.  Maybe a bit too strongly.

A piece of clear thinking it is not. It is worth a close look see:

A Hezbollah-run Arabic station could soon be broadcasting in Australia.

IMAGINE for a moment that Abu Bakr Bashir ordered his Jemaah Islamiah followers to start a satellite television station, perhaps called JI-TV.

But it hasn’t.   Read the rest of this entry »

Turnbull v Gretch – a truly ugly moment

August 6, 2009

Politics is as tough a gig as they come.  At the pointiest end, parliamentary politics, it can feel like a sitting in a blast furnace while having the weights dropped on you.  And I only know that from being a research officer/speech writer many years ago.  A hard day in court can be stressful.  With a grumpy judge or a case going to hell the adrenalin output must be equivalent to our ancestors reaction when first seeing the lion/sabertooth tiger up close and personal.  But usually the stress in court is anticipated and there is a conclusion to the terror.  Not so in politics.

How Turnbull could have emerged from this trainwreck?  Let’s look at it through the eyes of a lawyer.  After all he was a barrister for a while. Read the rest of this entry »

The End of the House of Lords……..judicially at least

August 1, 2009

The Law Lords are no more.  On 30 July 2009 the judicial work of the House of Lords ended.  And next Monday their Lordships find themselves as members of the United Kingdom Supreme Court.  Probably for the better though I thoroughly enjoy harmless anachronisms.  And there was something delightful in watching a Law Lord deliver his judgment as a speech from the benches of the House of Lords.  It was so informal and conversational.  It reminded me of what a wise colleague once said about the how the further up the legal tree the less the formality and stuffiness.  I think that is because the truly bright and competent don’t have the need to cloak any  insecurities in pomp, ceremony and unnecessary formality.  Some of the nonsense that some (and thankfully not many) Magistrates go on about on forms and process is enough to make a cat smile. 

Back to the House of Lords.  They went out with a bang not a whimper.  Seven judgements all in. And here they are:

Title

Number

Date of Judgment

Moore Stephens (a firm) (Respondents) v Stone Rolls Limited (in liquidation (Appellants)

[2009] UKHL 39

30 July 2009

Lexington Insurance Company (Respondents) v AGF Insurance Limited (Appellants) and one other action
Lexington Insurance Company (Respondent) v Wasa International Insurance Company Limited (Appellants) and one other action

[2009] UKHL 40

30 July 2009

Fisher (Original Respondent and Cross-appellant) v Brooker and others (Original Appellants and Cross-respondents)

[2009] UKHL 41

30 July 2009

R v C (Respondent) (On Appeal from the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division))

[2009] UKHL 42

30 July 2009

Masri (Respondent) v Consolidated Contractors International Company SAL and others and another (Appellant) and another

[2009] UKHL 43

30 July 2009

Transport for London (London Underground Limited) (Appellants) v Spirerose Limited (in administration) (Respondents)

[2009] UKHL 44

30 July 2009

R (on the application of Purdy) (Appellant) v Director of Public Prosecutions (Respondent)

[2009] UKHL 45

30 July 2009

The most contentious is the last in the list. 

Police torts, assault, claim for aggravated damages and exemplary damages: Walker & Anor v Hamm & Ors (No 2) [2009] VSC 290 (22 July 2009)

July 23, 2009

Yesterday Smith J handed down final orders in the Walker & Anor v Hamm & Ors (No 2) [2009] VSC 290.   The final outcome is, on my research, a record in Victoria (and probably in Australia) for an award for a police tort (assault by the coppers). The final awards are:

Conclusion

158 To sum up, I have come to the conclusion that aggravated damages should be awarded to Donald Walker in the sum of $200,000. He should also receive $400,000 by way of exemplary damages. Marcus Walker should be awarded aggravated damages of $75,000. The estate should be awarded aggravated damages of $100,000.

159 In relation to interest, interest on general damages should be awarded as follows:

  • Donald Walker $63,000
  • Marcus Walker $42,000
  • Marcia Walker’s Estate $21,000

Interest should be awarded on their damages for economic loss to Donald and Marcus Walker as follows:

  • Donald Walker $310,843 and $98.63 per day from 18 May 2009
  • Marcus Walker $128,492 and $54 per day from 18 May 2009

160 As to costs, the defendants should be ordered to pay the plaintiffs’ costs in each proceeding on an indemnity basis.

Ron Meldrum QC acted for the plaintiffs.  I was his junior and will be at the appeal.

The Herald Sun gave the case a front page splash today with a very tough editorial

The defendants have indicated that this case will go on appeal.  C’est la vie.

Just to show that some with a badge and some authority just don’t get it there is an article in today’s Herald Sun Connex staff allegedly put woman in headlock at station.   

 

 

Phone hacking settlement – another reason for an enforceable right to privacy

July 10, 2009

Today’s report from the Guardian Newspaper on line Murdoch papers paid £1m to gag phone-hacking  that News of the World had hacked into phones of celebrities and taped their conversations.  In a related article Trail of hacking and deceit under nose of Tory PR chief said:

Among those whose privacy apparently was illegally violated when British Telecom was conned into handing over their addresses and/or ex-directory numbers are Nigella Lawson (four times); Patsy Kensit; Jude Law and Sadie Frost; Lisa Snowdon (three times); Anne Robinson and her former partner; Carol Caplin; Lenny Henry; Vanessa Feltz; Lord Mountbatten’s grandson; and witnesses to the murder of Jill Dando, thus potentially interfering with the course of a live police inquiry.

Why the British Police didn’t tell the people whose privacy has been compromised is beyond me.  Their rights have been infringed.  It is not enough for the police to prosecute the offences.  If they know a person’s property has been trespassed upon they would notify the owner.  Simple as that.  Why the mystery of phones or computers? 

In the Australian/Victorian context there is probably a breach of the Telecommunications Act for obtaining the phone details illegally and for hacking into the phones and a breach of the state Listening Devices Act for taping the conversations. 

But none of that gives the persons whose privacy was breached any great comfort.  It is their rights that have been violated.  Under Gillers v Procopets there is a reasonable chance of being successful though it might be hard to show there there was an intention to cause distress or humiliation or whether there was humiliation.  Frankly a breach of privacy like this should be actionable per se.  That is damage should be presumed.  Hacking into private communications is like rummaging around somebodies personal effects on their property.  The difference is that physically going onto one’s property without consent or licence and rifling through one’s things is trespass and actionable per se.  But breaching the privacy of another is not.  The law needs to develop with the times. 

Under the proposed the ALRC recommendation for the statutory right of privacy the test is:

Recommendation 74–1 < ?xml:namespace prefix ="" o ns ="" "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" />

Federal legislation should provide for a statutory cause of action for a serious invasion of privacy. The Act should contain a non- exhaustive list of the types of invasion that fall within the cause of action. For example, a serious invasion of privacy may occur where:

(a) there has been an interference with an individual’s home or family life;

(b) an individual has been subjected to unauthorised surveillance;

(c) an  individual’s  correspondence  or  private  written,  oral  or  electronic communication has been interfered with, misused or disclosed; or

(d) sensitive facts relating to an individual’s private life have been disclosed.

 

Recommendation 74–2

Federal  legislation  should  provide  that,  for  the purpose of establishing liability under the statutory cause of action for invasion of privacy, a claimant must show that in the circumstances:

(a) there is a reasonable expectation of privacy; and

(b) the  act  or  conduct  complained  of  is  highly  offensive  to  a  reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities.

In determining whether an individual’s privacy has been invaded for the purpose of establishing the cause of action, the court must take into account whether the public interest in maintaining the claimant’s privacy outweighs other matters of public interest (including the interest of the public to be informed about matters of public concern and the public interest in allowing freedom of expression).

If these breaches happened in Australia and there was a statutory right, I think there would be a good chance of success.  The issue would be whether there was disclosure of sensitive facts.  In defamation publication only needs to be to a third party.  Given the egregiuos nature of this breach it wouldn’t be a brave submission to say disclosure within the Murdoch would probably be enough,  If it was disclosed to the general public the argument would be unassailable. 

Interesting days indeed.  Now will the Federal Government do the right thing and enact a statutory right while batting away the shrill complaints of the Murdoch Press. 

 

 

 

 

 

A new entry for the Orwellian doublespeak award ‘ The Lexicon of Terrorism” project.

July 6, 2009

Doug McClelland is one of the better Federal Attorney General’s of late.  He is experienced in the black arts of politics and  knows his way around the corridors of power (unlike Darryl Williams) and doesn’t see his role to be an attack dog for the government (ie he is not Ruddock lite).  Unlike his state counterparts he doesn’t bang the law and order drum until the skin breaks (Hatzistigos in NSW) or become an affirmative action zealot (Hulls) though he seems to be gently nods in that general direction.  All in all he is working quietly and smoothly through his portfolio pushing through reforms to the courts and procedures.  How well they work out is a matter for time to tell. 

So it is all the more disappointing to read about the Lexicon of Terrorism project in today’s email. 

Attorney-General, Robert McClelland, today welcomed the national roll-out of a project to

promote the consistent use of language in engaging with communities on national security

issues.

While we are working on lexicon:

When is a “lawyer” really a lawyer

July 5, 2009

When I read the quite slashing piece in today’s Australian Christopher Pyne is member for whatever it takes I was struck by the description of Christopher Pyne as a former lawyer. Given he was elected to the Federal Parliament when 25 years of age I wondered what he did to earn that moniker.  With the standard 5 years course he must have got his degree,  finished his articles and  rushed off to be sworn in as the member for Sturt a couple of hours after being admitted to practice.  Perhaps a rhetorical flourish but it makes the point.  Having a law degree does not a lawyer make.  Read the rest of this entry »

Preliminary discovery: Australian Football League v Stadium Operations Limited [2009] VSC 264 (25 June 2009)

June 27, 2009

It is a fair bet that there will be a few more entries onto the austlii site in the Australian Football League v Stadium Operations a dispute between the AFL and the owners of Etihad Stadium about use of the stadium, naming rights etc. The opening round, in court at least, was the  decision by Warren CJ regarding a preliminary discovery application.  The AFL was generally successful.

Preliminary discovery is a potent but poorly understood process.  There seems to be a reflexive reluctance to make the application.  Warren CJ has provided a good encapsulation of the main principles. The starting point for her analysis is Read the rest of this entry »

Equity and the doctrine of contribution & “Co ordinate Liability”; the High Court in Friend v Brooker [2009] HCA 21 (28 May 2009)

June 21, 2009

In Friend v Brooker [2009] HCA 21 the High Court, in again taking issue with the New South Wales Court of Appeal, has undertaken a useful review of equitable principles vis a vis co ordinate liability. It has again opted for a stricter construction of equitable principles.

Facts (pars [10] – [ 37])

The facts are quite prosaic and depressingly familiar for those in small business. The Plaintiff/Respondent (Brooker) and Defendant/Appellant (Friend) establish an engineering business together, operating through a company. The Company performs a large job for the sum of $2.5million, in this case for a Council. The account is disputed, at least in part. This results in a liquidity crisis made all the more precarious because the Company’s indebtedness was secured by mortgages over Brooker and Friend properties. Brooker turns to a third party, a friend, for finance. The friend, through a company, loans Brooker $350,000 securing it with a mortgages over properties owned by Brooker family members as well as a guarantee by Brooker. Of the sum lent $330,000 was applied to discharge the Company’s debts. The Council ultimately made payment of a significant amount of the monies outstanding, $900,000, to the company as per a settlement. Brooker, not surprisingly, wants to apply that sum to his outstanding indebtedness which had blown out to $1.1million.

The trial judge dismissed Brooker’s claim and found there was no agreement. The Court of Appeal found, by a 2 – 1 majority, that Friend was liable in equity to contribute though on slightly differing grounds. The President found there was a common obligation arising out of the facts while McColl found there was a fiduciary obligation which required each director to meet an equal share of the capital contribution.

The Decision

Per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne & Bell.

The majority, in a comprehensive analysis, stated that in contribution matters equity is concerned with the equality of exposure of obligers (debtors) to an obligee (creditor). Equity intervenes to ensure that the debtors share a common burden, for example where a creditor seeks to recover only against one debtor, but not where all the obligers may derive some benefit. For equity to apply there must be a co ordinate liabilities regarding a debt (pars 38 & 39). The Court made it clear Read the rest of this entry »

Malicious falsehood & illegal interference with business: C-Tech Laser Pty Ltd & Anor v Truong [2009] VSC 229 (15 June 2009)

Justice Beach continues to set a cracking pace in the judgment reaching and decision writing stakes with his, now typically, clearly written decision in C-Tech Laser Pty Ltd & Anor v Truong [2009] VSC 229 (15 June 2009) , and appeal from the Magistrates Court. Beach J together with the other recent appointments Judd, Vickery and Davies produce clear, concise and decisive judgments, much like Gordon J of the Federal Court.

In C-Tech Beach J considers the elements in a malicious falsehood claim. Malicious falsehood (also known as injurious falsehood) is not often pleaded. There was often no good reason to plead it because the facts generally supported a claim in defamation. The advantage of relying upon defamation was that it is actionable per se; with damages being at large. Further there is not need to prove malice in defamation. The reforms to Defamation with the Defamation Act 2005 means that, under section 9, most corporations are precluded from suing in defamation. With the amendment to the defamation law (in the main a great improvement) pleading malicious falsehood is a legitimate response to a tortious wrong. The issue of malice still provides evidential challenges however often evidence of the accompanying or subsequent behaviour of the putative defendant can be relied upon to draw that inference.

The facts

The Appellant’s causes of action were malicious falsehood and unlawful interference with business.

The Appellant pleaded Read the rest of this entry »