ASIC commences action against FIIG Securities for cyber security failures
March 14, 2025
The Australian Securities and Investment Commission announced yesterday that it was suing FIIG Securities for “systemic and prolonged cyber security failures” from March 2019 until 8 June 2023. As a result hackers entered FIIG’s IT system and stole personal information which was released onto the dark web. ASIC specifically referred to the Federal Court decision of Australian Securities and Investments Commission v RI Advice Group Pty Ltd (No 3) [2022] FCA 84. This was the first case where the failure to manage cyber risk was found to be a breach of its financial services obligations. That case was settled with the proposed parties proposing consent orders containing declarations and consequential orders. Given the nature of the repeated breaches RI Advices legal representatives negotiated quite a favourable outcome notwithstanding orders were made against their client. In the United States or the UK the penalties would have been much more severe.
Helpfully ASIC has provided a concise statement of facts and the Orginating Process. From that ASIC alleges that between 13 March 2019 and 8 June 2023, FIIG did not comply with its AFSL obligations under sections 912A(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to:
- do all things necessary to ensure that financial services were provided efficiently, honestly and fairly (s 912A(1)(a)), by failing to have in place adequate measures to protect its clients from the risks and consequences of a cyber incident;
- have available adequate resources (including financial, technological, and human resources) to, amongst other things, ensure that it had in place adequate cyber security measures required by its licence (s 912A(1)(d)); and
- have in place a risk management system that adequately identified and evaluated the risks faced by FIIG and its clients; adopt controls adequate to manage or mitigate those risks to a reasonable level; and implement those controls (s 912A(1)(h)).
ASIC alleges that FIIG failed to have the following cybersecurity measures:
- Planning and training: here was no cyber incident plan communicated and accessible to employees which is tested at least annually, and mandatory cyber security training (at commencement of employment and annually);
- Access restrictions:
- there were no proper management of privileged access to accounts, including non required access being revoked, and greater protections for privileged accounts; and
- configuration of group policies to disable legacy and insecure authentication protocols;
- Technical monitoring, detection, patches and updates: there was a failure to have or inadequate
- vulnerability scanning, involving tools deployed across networks and endpoints, and processes run at least quarterly with results reviewed and actions taken to address vulnerabilities;
- next-generation firewalls (including rules preventing endpoints from accessing file transfer protocol services);
- endpoint detection and response software on all endpoints and servers, with automatic updates and daily monitoring by a sufficiently skilled person;
- patching and software update plans (with critical or high importance patches applied within 1 month of release, and 3 months for all others), and a practice of updating all operating systems, with compensating controls to systems incapable of patching or updates; and
- security incident event management software configured to collect and consolidate security information across all of FIIG’s systems with appropriate analysis of the same (daily monitoring);
- Testing: there was a lack of
- processes to review and evaluate efficacy of technical controls at least quarterly; and
- penetration and vulnerability tests from internal and external points.