Information Commissioner publishes concise statement in its civil penalty proceeding against Medibank Private
June 18, 2024
Yesterday the Australian Information Commissioner published its Concise statement in its civil penalty proceeding against Medibank Private. It has been reported in the ABC under the heading “The absence of multi-factor authentication led to the Medibank hack, regulator alleges.” The story has also been covered by the Guardian with Medibank’s lack of multi-factor authentication allowed hackers to infiltrate systems, regulator alleges.
The Commissioner has listed Important Facts as being:
- For the financial years ending 30 June 2021, 2022, and 2023, Medibank generated revenue of approximately $6.9 billion, $7.1 billion, and $7.1 billion and annual profit before tax of $632.3 million, $560 million, and $727.1 million,respectively.
- As at 30 June 2022, Medibank employed approximately 3,291 full time employees
- the personal information collected and held by Medibank included:
- names,
- dates of birth,
- home addresses,
- phone numbers,
- email addresses,
- employment details,
passport numbers, - Medicare numbers,
- financial information
- sensitive information such as:
- sensitive information about customers’
- race and ethnicity
- illnesses,
- disabilities or injuries,
- health services
- Prior to 7 August 2022 an IT Service Desk Operator who was an employee of a Medibank contractor had access to Medibank Admin Account using his Medibank Credentials.
- the contractor saved his Medibank username and password (Medibank Credentials) to his personal internet browser profile on his work computer. When he subsequently signed into his internet browser profile on his personal computer, the Medibank Credentials were synced across to his personal computer
- the the Admin Account had access to most (if not all) of Medibank’s systems, including:
- network drives,
- management consoles, and
- remote desktop access to jump box servers (used to access certain Medibank directories and databases)
- on or about 7 August 2022 the Medibank Credentials were stolen from the IT Service Desk Operator’s personal computer by a threat actor, commonly and better known as a hacker using a variant of malware which is known to the parties but not publicly disclosed
- on 12 August 2022, log onto Medibank’s Microsoft Exchange server and test the Medibank Credentials for the Admin Account
- on or around 23 August 2022 the hacker authenticated and log onto Medibank’s “Global Protect”
Virtual Private Network (VPN) solution (which controlled remote access to the Medibank corporate network) & began typing malicious script - the hacker actor was able to authenticate and log onto Medibank’s Global Protect VPN using only the Medibank Credentials because, during the Relevant Period, access to Medibank’s Global Protect VPN did not require two or more proofs of identity or multi-factor authentication (MFA). Medibank’s Global Protect VPN was configured so that only a device certificate, or a username and password (such as the Medibank Credentials), was required
- on 25 and 25 August 2022 Medibank’s Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) Security Software sent alerts the hacker’s activities to a Medibank IT Security Operations email address. These alerts were not appropriately triaged or escalated by either Medibank or its service provider, Orro, at that time.
- from 25 August 2022 until around 13 October 2022 the hacker used Medibank Credentials to access numerous Medibank IT systems and exfiltrated 520 gigabytes of data including names, dates of birth, addresses, phone numbers, email addresses, Medicare numbers, passport numbers, health related information and claims data (such as patient names, provider names, primary/secondary diagnosis and procedure codes, treatment dates).
- On 11 October 2022, Medibank:
- triaged a high severity incident for a alert that identified modification of files needed to exploit the “ProxyNotShell” vulnerability.
- engaged Threat Intelligence, its existing digital forensics and incident response partner, to perform an incident response investigation.
- Until at least 16 October 2022, when a Threat Intelligence analyst noted that there had been a series of suspicious volumes of data exfiltrated out of Medibank’s network, Medibank was not aware that customer data had been accessed
- on 19 and 22 October 2022 respectively, Medibank was contacted by the hacker and provided with files containing sample data that had been exfiltrated from Medibank’s systems
- Between 9 November 2022 and 1 December 2022, the hacker published data exfiltrated during the data breach on the dark web.
