The Full Bench of the Federal Court in Georges v Seaborn International Pty Ltd (Trustee), in the matter of Sonray Capital Markets Pty Ltd (in liq) [2012] FCAFC 140 considered the right of the liquidator to recover proceeds of shares the purposes of pooling and distribution to creditors.

FACTS

Sonray was the holder of the Australian financial services licence from 4 May 2005 until it went into administration on 22 June 2010 [87]. It provided access to trading platforms made available by third parties. Clients deposited money with Sonray, which was held in accounts and subject to statutory trust under the Corporations Act [88]. It had 18 segregated accounts which were used to receive deposits in respect of margin calls, proposed trades and the return of funds. In these accounts clients’ funds were co-mingled with funds from other clients [90] to the point where the trial judge found that the funds were so thoroughly mixed as to be almost impossible to ascertain entitlements to each of the segregated accounts [93]. Efax, the trustee of a family trust, entered into a written agreement in 2009 with Sonray regarding its trading activities.  In April 2010 Efax instructed Sonray to purchase 78,000 shares in BHP Billiton Ltd (“BHP”) [5] for $3 million [6], which it did through Saxo Bank (“Saxo”), one of its trading platforms. Efax’s funding for the purchase was deposited into a Sonray accounted which was subject to numerous defalcations.  The purchase price for the shares however was not paid out of a tainted account but rather by Saxo using its own money or by way of credit arrangements.  Sonray debited Efax’s ledger account with the purchase price of the BHP shares.

The Liquidators seek a direction to allow them to pool shares purchased on instructions by Efax with proceeds attributable to all other Sonray clients which would then be distributed amongst all of the clients [8].

 The trial judge held that Efax is entitled to resist the claim for pooling on the ground that it is entitled to the BHP shares in specie [9].

DECISION

The Majority upheld the appeal by a 2-1 majority.

THE MAJORITY

Jacobsen J

His Honour commenced his analysis by Read the rest of this entry »

In ACN 079 638 501 Pty Ltd (in liq) (recs & mgrs apptd) v Pattison & Anor [2012] VSC 445 Justice Ferguson considered whether work in progress was covered by a charge given by company.

FACTS

Mr Paul Pattison (“Pattison”),  a qualified chartered accountant and registered liquidator and trustee in bankruptcy established and was sole director and secretary of the Plaintiff. Until April 2010 he conducted his insolvency practice through the Plaintiff [1]. In November 2006 the Plaintiff charged its assets in favour of bank of Western Australia Ltd (“BankWest”). In 2010 BankWest appointed receivers and managers over the assets of the Plaintiff under the charge [2] & [10] – [11].

The issue in the proceeding was whether the work in progress recorded in the books of the Plaintiff, being time spent by Pattison working on insolvency administrations was an asset caught by the charge [3]. Pattison contended that his appointments were personal to him and the Plaintiff provided services to him in connection with those appointments [4]. The receivers contended that all work performed by him pursuant to his appointments as liquidator, deed administrator or trustee in bankruptcy was performed as an employee of the Plaintiff and his work in progress was an asset of the Plaintiff.

DECISION

Her Honour found:

1. the Plaintiff would raise invoices  for fees and disbursements payable [7]. The time spent by Pattison was included in the Plaintiff”s invoice on a separate charge made by him personally;
2. cheques would be paid to Pattison and he would endorse them as payable to the Plaintiff. Payment was made into the company’s bank account [7]; and
3. the Plaintiff’s payslips evidence fortnightly wages payable to Pattison as an employee although this was disputed in part [8].

Ferguson J framed the question as, at [15]:

..the real question is as to the relationship between Mr Pattison and the Company and the effect (if any) that that had on ownership of the work in progress.

The fact that Pattison had certain obligations arising Read the rest of this entry »

The Court of Appeal in Lederberger & Anor v Mediterranean Olives Financial Pty Ltd & Ors [2012] VSCA 262 considered issues of partnership, a solicitors duty to a client and the identity of parties to a contract.

FACTS

Hirsch Lederburger established Loaders Traders Pty Ltd  in the late 1950s.  In his will he left the third of his business to each of his son Israel,  Samuel and on trust in the estate with income to go to his wife, Mrs Lederberger. In 2000 Mrs Lederberger retained the third party to advise an act for her in proving the will of her late husband and obtain a grant of probate. In 2003 Samuel bought Israel’s share of the business. The will was proven on September 2003 and Mrs Lederberger became executrix  and sole trustee of her husband’s estate [4]. To minimise exposure to the debts of the business a partnership was established in 2003, Loaders Manufacturers and Traders (“Loaders Manufacturers”). Loaders Traders was a bare trustee for the partners of which Mrs Lederberger was one. The primary business activity was importing wholesaling and selling of camping goods[5]. Through Samuel, Loaders Manufacturers entered into a tax effective scheme, the Blue Gum scheme, [9] and the Mediterranean Olives Project [10]. Partners claimed and received reductions in the taxable income in 2006 and 2007 [11].

DECISION

The Honours identified the issues, at [3], as

1. with whom did the respondents contract
2. could the respondents rely upon post-contractual conduct to determine the identity of the contracting parties?
3. if the members of the partnership were the contracting parties, did Samuel Lederberger have actual or ostensible authority to enter into the contracts?
4. whether the  contracts involved carrying on in the usual way business of the kind carried on by the partnership?
5. whether the partners had provided authority to enter into the contracts pursuant to powers of attorney?
6. if Samuel Lederberger had acted without authority, had Mrs Lederberger ratified or impliedly sanctioned the investments?
7. was the trial judge able to make adverse findings of fact  which were contrary to the facts set out in a witness statement which had  not been the subject of cross examination?
8. was the third party obliged to advise the widow as to the risks associated with becoming the trustee of her husband’s estate?
9.  if the third party was breached its duty, was it causative of her liability to the respondents?

Identity & post contractual conduct

The Appellants contended that the trial judge erred in holding that the partners or Mrs Lederberger had entered into the contracts.  While their Honours rejected this ground they undertook a review of the law as to the methodology in determining the identity of a party to a contract and the admissibility of evidence, stating:

1. Identification of the parties to a contract must be in accordance with the objective theory of contract;  the conclusion of a reasonable person, with the knowledge of the words and actions of the parties communicated to each other, and the knowledge that the parties had of the surrounding circumstances; [19]
2. there needs Read the rest of this entry »

The Victorian Court of Appeal in 360 Capital Re Limited v Watts & Ors [2012] VSCA 234 dismissed an appeal from a decision in Watts & Watts & Ors v 360 Capital Re Limited & Anor [2012] VSC 320 which held modifications to the 360 Capital Fund’s constitution were invalid for want to compliance with section 601GC(1)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001 (the “Act”).

FACTS

The 360 Capital Industrial Fund (“360 Capital”) is a managed investment scheme under Chapter 5C of the Act. There are 180.63 million units in the Fund. The Constitution of the Fund relevantly provides, at [4] :

1) Clause 5.1(a): The Trustee could only issue units in accordance with clause 5 and subject to the Constitution.

2) Clause 5.2(a): The Trustee could not grant Options unless the Trust were Listed.

3) Clause 5.4: New Units were required to be issued at a price determined in accordance with clause 5.4.

4) Clause 13.5(a): An Option did not confer on the Optionholder any interest in the Fund.

On 31 May 2012 the directors of 360 Capital executed a Supplemental Deed Poll which Read the rest of this entry »

Yesterday the Corporations Legislation Amendment (Derivative Transactions) Bill 2012 was introduced into the House of Representatives.

It is a lengthy and significant bill providing:

Part 1—Amendment of the Corporations Act 2001

Corporations Act 2001

1  Section 9

Insert:

Australian derivative Read the rest of this entry »

Section 461(1)(k) of the Corporations Act is a very useful provision when dealing with directors and shareholders who are in dispute but there is no evidence of oppression (where sections 232 and 233 would apply). The circumstances giving rise to the court exercising the very broad discretion vary.  As such it is worth briefly reviewing 3  decisions to gauge the approach the court’s take in the very practical exercise of deciding whether it is appropriate to wind up a company; Giacobbe & Anor v Giacobbe & Anor [2012] VSC 285, Warner v Global Pacific Aerospace Pty Ltd & Anor [2012] VSC 291 and White Family No 1 Pty Ltd v Organic Brands Pty Ltd & Anor [2011] VSC 247.

Giacobbe & Anor v Giacobbe & Anor [2012] VSC 285

Facts

Michele and Antonio Giacobbe, brothers, went into business in 1962 manufacturing and selling office furniture. In October 1974, a family trust was established and the furniture business became an asset of the trust.  The beneficiaries of the trust were the two brothers and their respective family members. In the early 1980s, Michele and Antonio fell out Read the rest of this entry »

Today Justice Beach, in Barrow v McLernon & Anor [2012] VSC 134 handed down a very interesting and useful decision regarding discovery and the operation of section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act. It is an appeal from a decision of an Associate Justice.

FACTS

The Plaintiff is suing Hugh McLernon and IMF (Australia) Limited for defamation arising out of the publication on 30 May 2011 of an email and two pdf attachments [1]. The Plaintiff wishes to use documents discovered in this proceeding in support of issuing other proceedings, also a cause of action in defamation [2].  Five documents discovered constitute Read the rest of this entry »

In recent decisions of Sportsco Pty Ltd v Singh Group Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] VSC 576 (per Ferguson J) and BKW Investments Pty Ltd v Training Connect Limited [2011] FCA 1314 (per Cowdroy J) the courts considered applications to set aside statutory demands. In Sportsco the court, hearing an appeal from an Associate Justice, refused to set aside the application.  In BKW the court set aside the application.

Sportsco Pty Ltd v Singh Group Pty Ltd (No 2)

Facts

The underlying dispute related to the purchase of a franchise business.  Singh, the purchaser, submitted that the statutory demand on Sportsco for $70,500 was a refundable deposit under the franchise agreement. Sportsco, the vendor, applied to set aside the demand claiming there was a genuine dispute concerning the debt and that it had an offsetting claim.  Singh alleged there was an agreement that the money was refundable if it was unable to obtain finance for the franchise business.  Singh did not obtain finance.  While Singh was provided with an  an offer to lease premises from which the franchise would operate it was never executed by Singh.  Sportsco claimed there was a dispute as to what constituted the agreement and whether the agreement was subject to finance. It also claimed Singh was liable to pay a franchise royalty fee of five years as a consequence of the breach and was liable for damages of approximately $300,000.

Decision

Ferguson J referred to TR administration proprietor Ltd V Frank marketing and Sales Brochure Ltd as support forthe proposition that Read the rest of this entry »

In Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Healey Middleton J found against the directors of Centro Properties Limited.  It is a very long and detailed decision which provides an excellent summary of the obligations of directors.

Facts

ASIC alleged that the approval of the consolidated financial accounts of Centro Property Limited. Centro Property Trust and Centro Retail Trust for the financial year ending 30 June 2007 contravened sections 180(1), 344(1) and 601FD(3) of the Corporations Act 2001. Those contraventions included failing to disclose $1.5billion of short term liabilities of Centro Property and $500 million of Centro Retail by classifying them as non current liabilities and failing to disclose guarantees of short term liabilities of an associated company of about US $1.75 billion that had been given after the balance date (see [24] for a detailed summary of the issues).  Middleton J found that those matters were well known to the directors or, if not well known to them, should have been [11] & [23].

Middleton J found, at [8], the directors failed “..to take all reasonable steps required of them, and acted in the performance of their duties as directors without exercising the degree of care and diligence the law requires of them.”  His consideration of the facts with respect to each director is found at ([289] – [532]).  It is too extensive to comment upon here.  The focus of this post is on the legal principles enunciated by Middleton J.

Decision

Middleton J highlighted the consequences of the breaches and why they are significant when he said, at [10]:

This proceeding is not about a mere technical oversight. The information not disclosed was a matter of significance to the assessment of the risks facing CNP and CER. Giving that information to shareholders and, for a listed company, the market, is one of the fundamental purposes of the requirements of the Act that financial statements and reports must be prepared and published. The importance of the financial statements is one of the fundamental reasons why the directors are required to approve them and resolve that they give a true and fair view.

Principles

Middleton j restated the obligations and responsibilities of a director as: Read the rest of this entry »

In Cohen v State of Victoria Nos 3 (“Cohen”) Forrest J ordered indemnity costs against solicitor for the plaintiff, Oldham Naidoo, arising out of the application by the defendants in Cohen v State of Victoria No 2 which resulted in the proceedng being struck out as an abuse of process (which I reviewed here).

Facts

The relevant conduct upon which the court exercised its discretion is set out at [5]:

(a) the issuing of the proceeding on 24 December 2008 in the name of Dr Cohen without obtaining his instructions or authorisation to do so;

(b) the maintenance of the claim (for nearly two years) in the name of Dr Cohen without any communication to him advising that he was the named representative plaintiff and therefore the subject of a number of obligations including that imposed by s 33ZD of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic);

(c) the incurring of a number of costs orders against Dr Cohen – none of which were brought to his attention;

(d) the making of an allegation in the statement of claim central to Dr Cohen’s “claim” which, upon any reasonable investigation, was demonstrably false.

Decision

Principles

The key issues for consideration was whether there should be an award of costs against a legal practitioner acting without the authority of the client and, if so, whether to grant those costs on an indemnity rather than a party/party basis. In support of the former proposition Forrest J referred to the English  case of Fricker v Van  Glutten where his honour Read the rest of this entry »