I have posted on the Australian Privacy Commissioner’s findings of his review of privacy policies on the internet (found here).  It was part of a global internet sweep by privacy authorities.

The Canadian Privacy Commissioner’s office also released its findings which are as broadly similar to the Austrlian Privacy Commissioner’s findings but much more detailed.  The picture is not particularly good.  Too many policies are poorly drafted, incoherent and generally do not “get” what a privacy policy should do.

The Findings are set out below (and found here):

Privacy policies should be easy to understand and provide meaningful information, Privacy Commissioner says after the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada and other global data protection authorities sweep more than 2,000 online privacy policies.

OTTAWA, August 13, 2013 — From tweet-sized privacy statements Read the rest of this entry »

Internet filtering was a hottish topic in Australia pre election campaign, particularly with the Communications minister.  He was hardly the first enthusiast for some way of taming the internet of its more pernicious users. The BBC highlights in British Library’s wi-fi service blocks ‘violent’ Hamlet why it is such a flawed concept. The British Library’s wi fi network  filtered Hamlet because of its violent content.  One can only imagine what would have become of Macbeth Read the rest of this entry »

The tension between celebrities and the media over privacy is ongoing and occasionally flares up into open conflict, physical and legal.  To what extent do celebrities give up a right to privacy when they selectively seek out publicity seems to be the argument. The proposition is, of course, fatuous.  Because someone’s life involves publicity, such as an actor, politician or celebrity, does not mean their right to seclusion is extinguished.  There is no hypocrisy in engaging with the media in the course of work or even by choice and having a desire and entitlement to privacy in other aspects of one’s life, such as with family, children especially.   Variety in  Celebs Can’t Expect Privacy – But What About Their Kids?looks at that issue.  The law has considered this issue in the UK.  In Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd[2008] EWCA Civ 446 the Court of Appeal found that the children of celebrities were entitled to freedom from media intrusion.  The seminal decision of Hosking v Runting [2004] NZCA 34 where the New Zealand Court of Appeal established a tort of privacy involved photographs of the appellants’ children. In Australia the basis for the protection would be grounded in equity, following the UK line of authority rather than the New Zealand approach.

The article provides Read the rest of this entry »

The Information Commissioner’s Office has served the Bank of Scotland with a monetary penalty for wrongly and repeatedly faxing personal information, to unintended recipients.

The penalty notice relevantly provides (found here):

Background Checks has listed the best apps to protect one’s mobile device.  The post is found Read the rest of this entry »

Last week was the scheduled final sitting week of this Parliament.  It is due to be prorogued in either August or September.

As such any bills not passed by both Houses of Parliament will lapse.  That seems to be the fate of the Privacy Amendment (Privacy Alerts) Bill 3023.  The political drama took effect upon the legislative schedule.

It will be for the next Parliament to introduce this Bill or a facsimile of it.  If it is so minded to do.  A new Parliament is a legislative Tabula Rasa.

Data storage the cloud in is ubiquitous.  Proper protection of that data is less so.

According to research (see report here)conducted by the Ponemon Institute,based on a survey of 4,205 business and IT managers in the US, UK, Germany, France, Australia, Japan and Brazil, 53% of businesses transfer sensitive or confidential data to the cloud.

The Committee has received 20 submissions to the Bill.  That is impressive given there was effectively 2 days from referral to cut off period to lodge submissions.

The submissions are:

Fundraising Institute Australia.

Opposed. It says, in part:

.. the Fundraising Institute Australia believes that insufficient consideration has been given to the effect which mandatory data breach notification would have on charities and not-for-profit organisations. Government decision­ makers seem unaware that fundraisers use extensive donor databases in the same way as business organisations do.

………

The additional burden and cost of Read the rest of this entry »

In Prest v Petrodel Resources 2013] UKSC 34 the UK Supreme Court considered when it was appropriate to pierce the corporate veil of companies. It is a very significant decision which may be influential in Australia.

 FACTS

The appeal relates to ancillary relief sought by the respondent following divorce proceedings.  The Appellant, the wife, sought recovery under the Matrimonial Causes Act or orders which would permit the court to pierce the corporate veil of a number of companies which were wholly owned and controlled by the the husband.  At first instance the trial judge found there was no general principle which entitled him to reach the companies assets by piercing the corporate veil [6].  The wife was unsuccessful on appeal to the Court of Appeal.

DECISION

The wife was successful on the basis, the court found, that the husband, and not the companies, had originally provided the funds for the properties in dispute to be bought.  Trust law principles were applied and the court found that the companies held the properties in trust for him.  As he was ‘entitled’ to them the court could transfer them to the wife.

While the Appellant was unsuccessful in her appeal seeking order to pierce the corporate veil  the judgment was most significant in its consideration of the principle as to when the corporate veil may be pierced and the limitations on the doctrine.

LORD SUMPTION

His Lordship commenced his analysis by discussing what piercing the corporate veil actually means and, critically, what it doesn’t mean. As to its meaning he said “..properly speaking, it means disregarding the separate personality of the company…” where “.. a person who owns and controls a company is said in certain circumstances to be identified with it in law by virtue of that ownership and control [16].” he drew a distinction between those circumstances and where the law attributes the acts or property of the company to those who control including:

1. where the controller Read the rest of this entry »

 In a unanimous decision the High Court in Kakavas v Crown Melbourne Limited [2013] HCA 25 rejected an appeal by Harry Kakavas against Crown Casino in equity.  The court undertook a detailed analysis of the principles of unconscionable conduct and special disadvantage.

FACTS

Kakavas submitted, at [6], that the principles of Amadio applied, particularly that “..whenever one party by reason of some condition or circumstance is placed at a special disadvantage vis-à-vis another and unfair or unconscientious advantage is then taken of the opportunity thereby created”. He also submitted that Crown had constructive notice of his special disadvantage [150].

Crown submitted:

1. that Kakavas’ abnormally strong urge to gamble was not a compulsion which deprived him of the ability to make a worthwhile choice whether or not to gamble, or to continue to gamble, with Crown or anyone else [11];
2. Crown’s employees did not knowingly exploit the appellant’s abnormal interest in gambling. Kakavas presented as a successful businessman able to afford to indulge himself in the high stakes gambling in which he chose to engage [11]
3. Kakavas suffered no compensable loss [12]

DECISION

 The court undertook a detailed overview of the principle of equitable fraud.  When the considering the principles of equity enunciated in Amadio their Honours stated:

“..the task of the courts is to determine whether the whole course of dealing between the parties has been such that, as between the parties, responsibility for the plaintiff’s loss should be ascribed to unconscientious conduct on the part of the defendant.”

When seeking equitable intervention their Honours stated the following:

1. the principle which the appellant invokes Read the rest of this entry »