Retrieval of famous author’s earlier burnt offerings are quite common practice.  Whether it is a good practice is another thing.  When James Elroy became a minor celebrity with LA Confidential his publishers re-badged and released Brown’s Requiem and then  Silent Terror which was renamed Killer on the Road.  And now everything he produces is rushed into print.  The problem is the latest material is virtually unreadable.  The Cold Six Thousand is a rush of phrases wandering the pages looking for verbs. Dan Browns’ earlier detritus was re released once the Da Vinci Code took off and became the phenomena it is (a great story written very badly).

Where matters get tricky, ethically speaking, is where the author has died and his or her unpublished or unfinished works are found.  The temptation is to mine the rich seam. Salinger, he of the Catcher in the Rye, apparently had a safe full of unpublished manuscripts which were the stuff of literary gossip for years before his death.  He has died and the library stacks are not groaning under the weight of his posthumous offerings.  Let’s hope it stays that way. A writer should enjoy sufficient respect to have their creative wishes accepted.  A manuscript can be nothing more than a poor first draft.  Hemingway said the first draft of anything is rubbish (actually in terms stronger).  It can also be better than the published version.  The point is that most unpublished manuscripts are that way for a reason, especially for the established authors.  Cashing in on a writer’s legacy is an appalling breach of trust. But there is a real issue where there is a genuine offering by an author who, for prosaic reasons, didn’t submit a manuscript for publication.  That is where things become complicated.

]]> http://www.peteraclarke.com.au/2010/06/15/stieg-larsson-publishes-from-beyond-9/feed/ 0 http://www.peteraclarke.com.au/2010/05/17/matthew-newton-a-case-study-on-privacy/ http://www.peteraclarke.com.au/2010/05/17/matthew-newton-a-case-study-on-privacy/#comments Mon, 17 May 2010 04:35:05 +0000 Peter Clarke http://www.peteraclarke.com.au/?p=751 I was initially appalled by the media’s intrusion into Matthew Newton’s admission for in patient treatment for substance abuse.  That is one of those matters where privacy should be afforded.  In UK the House of Lords found it so with Naomi Campbell in Campbell v MGN Limited. The media, especially the tabloid press. were all over it. There are similarities in the cases. Both were minor celebrities with a reputation for anti social antics.  Neither advertised or highlighted their addictions.  There are differences too.  And that it is the rub.  Campbell did not engage the media about her problem.  It remained private to her. In that respect the sting of the invasion of her privacy was pronounced.   It seems team Newton can’t keep their traps shut.

The Herald had a splash on 27 April with Bert Newton’s son Matthew being treated at a Melbourne rehabilitation clinic

Yesterday, his mother Patti Newton said her son was still recovering from his unspecified personal issues.

“It is a health issue and he needs time to recover,” she said.

The one-time Dancing With The Stars contestant said she and husband Bert believed their son’s privacy was paramount.

“We support him and we love him and we just want people to leave him alone so he can mend,” she said.

Newton’s agent Titus Day said his client was making good progress.

“He’s doing really well, apparently,” Day said yesterday.

And then today’s piece Matthew Newton in Sydney on the road to recovery after stint in rehab.  Everybody jumps in for a say with:

Yesterday, his mother Patti Newton said her son was still recovering from his unspecified personal issues.

“It is a health issue and he needs time to recover,” she said.

The one-time Dancing With The Stars contestant said she and husband Bert believed their son’s privacy was paramount.

“We support him and we love him and we just want people to leave him alone so he can mend,” she said.

Newton’s agent Titus Day said his client was making good progress.

“He’s doing really well, apparently,” Day said yesterday.

So everybody around him is now giving a sound bite.   Having dealt with the press and press secretaries and public relations flacks there is pressure to manage the media lest it manage you.   I don’ t buy it. It is possible, and often easier than one imagine to throw a blanket over a story. Here Newton pater and mater engaged and became part of the story.  Of course none of this has anything to do with Matthew. If he was to enforce his rights he would not have to have regard to the trailer park desire for a quote by his relatives. But it is an awful look.

FACTS

After some negotiations, [5] – [6], News Limited (“News”), engaged Bruce Guthrie (“Guthrie”), as editor in chief of the Herald Sun, commencing 19 February 2007.  From March 2007 differences emerged between Peter Blunden (“Blunden”), the managing director (and previous editor) and Guthrie.  In August and October 2008 there were significant arguments between Guthrie and Blunden. On 11 October 2008 John Hartigan, the chairman and CEO of News, came to the view that the working relations between these two senior executives had irretrievably broken down and decided to terminate Guthrie from his position. He did so on 10 November.  Hartigan sought to keep Guthrie within News, suggesting a position in Sydney.  Guthrie declined stating that he had just purchased a house in Melbourne, was selling his Sydney home and his eldest daughter was doing her final year of school.

ISSUES

Kaye J set out, at [18],  the issues for determination as:

(1) Did the contract of service between the plaintiff and the defendant entitle the defendant to terminate the plaintiff’s employment in November 2008, before the expiration of the three year period of service set by the contract?

(2) If the contract of service did contain a provision entitling the defendant to terminate the plaintiff’s contract of service in November 2008 –

(a) was there an implied term of the contract that the defendant would act in good faith in exercising that power under the contract;

(b) if so, did the defendant breach such obligation of good faith in terminating the plaintiff’s employment with it?

(3) If the defendant breached the contract of service by terminating the plaintiff’s employment in November 2008, is the plaintiff entitled to make a claim for damages, arising from such breach, comprising the loss of opportunity by him, in February 2010, to obtain a renewal of that contract of service?

(4) If the plaintiff is entitled to maintain such a claim for loss and damage, did the plaintiff lose such an opportunity of renewal of his contract of service, by reason of the termination of his employment in November 2008, and, if so, what is the value of that lost chance to the plaintiff?

(5) Alternatively, is the plaintiff entitled to claim the additional payment asserted by him as the alternative basis by which he claims loss and damage?

(6) If the plaintiff is entitled to claim the termination payment, what is the amount of that payment?

DECISION

His Honour undertook  a very detailed analysis of the evidence and counsel’s submissions upon it, [75] – [165].  His Honour’s findings with respect to News’ witnesses were, on material issues, quite negative.

LOSS OF OPPORTUNITY

Kaye J found there were conflicting lines of authority regarding the right to claim a loss of opportunity.  Two New South Wales Court of Appeal decisions, New South Wales Cancer Council v Sarfaty and Murray Irrigation Limited v Balsdon found there was no basis in law to claim a loss of opportunity.  In the Federal Court decision of Martin v Tasmanian Development & Resources the Federal Court per Heerey (and upheld on appeal)  found there was a right of an employee to recover damages for loss of opportunity after wrongful dismissal.  Kaye J  (see [48] – [50]) and Heerey J distinguished  Sarfaty on the basis that in the latter the analysis of the High Court in  Commonwealth v AmannAviation Pty Ltd was wrong, see [52].  Kaye J found that the High Court did not

..preclude their Honours, in Amann Aviation, from upholding the claim of Amann, a necessary part of which was a claim for loss of opportunity to renew its contract with the Commonwealth. Their Honours recited the principle, which I have quoted above, but distinguished it, on the basis that, in a claim for loss of opportunity, the court is engaged in a hypothetical exercise, in determining how the contract would have turned out, if it had not been brought to an end by the Commonwealth’s wrongful repudiation of it. Thus, the passage from their Honour’s judgment, relied upon by Gleeson CJ and Handley JA in Sarfaty, did not support the conclusion that an employee may not make a claim for damages for loss of opportunity.

Kaye J regarded the second NSW decision of Murray Irrigation, the last in time, as not precluding a loss of opportunity action.

After a detailed analysis Kaye J found, at [57], that the authorities:

support the proposition that an employee may claim damages for loss of opportunity to renew a contract of employment which has been wrongfully terminated by the employer.

Kaye stated, at [58], that whether a plaintiff can recover in a claim of loss of opportunity depends on:

(1) Whether at the time at which the parties entered into the contract, it may be reasonably supposed to have been in their contemplation that, as the probable result of a breach of that contract by the defendant before its expiration, the plaintiff might suffer a loss of a valuable opportunity to renew or extend his contract with the defendant.

(2) If so, whether the plaintiff, as a result of the breach by the defendant of the contract in November 2008, did in fact lose a valuable opportunity to renew or extend his contract with the defendant.

The practical application of that test is, at [60], determining what information was available to the defendant employer at the time the contract was entered into and postulating whether it would have realised there would be a loss of opportunity to the plaintiff employee to renew his/her contract was a likely result of a wrongful termination of the existing contract. Kaye J found, at [61], on the first question that from the express terms of the contract and the background facts, that News was aware that with Guthrie’s wrongful termination he would  not have the  opportunity to obtain a renewal.

On the second question, whether there was a valuable loss of opportunity, Amman Aviation and Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL & Ors make it clear that in determining damages for loss of opportunity it is necessary to determine the probabilities of what would might have happened, see [167].  Kaye J undertook a detailed analysis of the evidence at [168] and [171] – [177].  His Honour found there was no prospect on the evidence that Hartigan would have renewed Guthrie’s appointment as editor in chief of the Herald Sun, see [169] – [170].  He also found there was no evidence that there was a chance of an alternate position within News being made available to Guthrie, see [178].

DAMAGES – WRONGFUL TERMINATION

The Plaintiff’s alternate claim was that under the contract he was entitled to a termination payment as at the completion of the contract, being 18 February 2010. The issue was the construction of clause 22.4. It is set out at [24] as:

22.4 Redundancy

In the event that your contract is not renewed, the Company may redeploy you to any other comparable position which is available within the company or the group. However, if the Company is unable to obtain for you offer of a comparable position, the Company will terminate your employment. In these circumstances, in addition to your entitlements under clause 22.3, you will receive a termination payment which is inclusive of notice and redundancy/severance pay. In determining an appropriate termination payment, the Company will take into account any applicable legislative requirements and your length of service with the Company.

If the Company obtains an offer of a comparable position for you and you do not accept the offer, you will only receive the payments due to you under clause 22.3.”

His Honour summarised the principles relating to the appropriate length of notice for a party not a fixed term contract as:

(1) The appropriate length of the “reasonable notice” (or period in lieu of which payment should be made) is determined at the time at which notice of termination of the employment is given, and not when the contract of employment was entered into.

(2) In determining what is a reasonable period of notice, it is important to bear in mind the primary purpose served by the giving of such notice, namely, to enable the employee to obtain new employment of a similar nature.

(3) Factors which are taken into account in order to determine the appropriate length of notice include matters pertinent to the nature of the employment itself, and also matters personal to the employee. Thus, they include the level of responsibility assumed by the employee, the high grade of his appointment, the importance of his position, the size of his salary, and industry practice. They also include matters personal to the individual employee, including the length of the employee’s service with the defendant, the employee’s age, the nature of the employment which the employee left, or gave up, in order to serve the present employer, and the expected period of time it would take for the employee to find suitable alternative employment.

(4) Damages arising from the failure of the employer to give adequate notice, or to provide adequate payment in lieu of such notice, are calculated in gross monies, and not net of taxation.

His Honour found:

Members of the House of Representatives, Rick Boucher and Cliff Stearns, members of  the House’s Subcommittee on Communications, Technology and the Internet have introduced a bill that mandates information to be given to website visitors to improve privacy protections in the US. It also lists types of data that can be used until people opt out, and others that can be used only with their consent. Relevant features are:

1. “Covered information” is defined to include, among other things, names, postal and email addresses, fingerprints and retina scans, Social Security and credit card numbers and Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.
2. an organisation “shall not collect, use or disclose covered information from or about an individual for any purpose” unless it makes available a privacy notice and obtains the user’s consent, though that consent can be implied.
3. a privacy notice must be “posted clearly and conspicuously on the website” and it must be accessible from a link on the site’s homepage. The organisation has to include, among other things, details of the purposes for which the data are collected and used; how it stores the information; how it may merge or link the information collected about the individual with other information about the individual that it may acquire from unaffiliated parties; how it may share the information; long it will retain the information “in identifiable form” and how it will dispose of it.
4. an organisation shall be considered to have the individual’s consent to the collection and use of covered information if it provides the privacy policy or statement and if the individual “either affirmatively grants consent for such collection and use or does not decline consent at the time such statement is presented to the individual.”
5. the right of the organisation to share that data with third parties is limited “without first obtaining express affirmative consent” from the subject. The individual’s “express affirmative consent” will also be required to make material changes to a privacy policy.
6. “Sensitive information” is defined as including medical records, race or ethnicity, religious beliefs, sexual orientation, financial records and precise geolocation information. An organisation must not collect or disclose sensitive information from or about an individual unless it makes available its privacy notice before collecting such data and obtains the individual’s express affirmative consent.
7. it does not apply to government agencies; and it will not apply to organisations that collect covered information from fewer than 5,000 people in any 12-month period and that do not collect sensitive information.
8. it  bars some sharing of information with other companies, but it makes an exception for advertising networks, which can have access to the information.\

Of particular interest is:

an online register will be established to improve the dissemination of information about suppression orders and provide for the distribution of details on a national scale; and

a register which will be a national ‘first point of contact’ with courts and tribunals providing basic data about whether a suppression order has been made in a particular case and relevant contact information enabling interested parties to make further enquiries.

Richard Ackland has an interesting piece (coincidentally) in today’s SMH on a speech given by David Levine, former New South Wales Supreme Court justice and general doyen of defamation law.

But the banner is total nonsense.  It has nothing to do with the article.  It is utterly misleading.  The article is not a particularly flash up and down the wicket defence of free speech, even of the obnoxious kind and a kick against Islamic Fascist behaviour in forcing self censorship.  As an article it is a very rough second draft of a first year essay.  I agree with her sentiments but an unsubtle defence of free speech by throwing slabs of anecdotes is pretty sloppy journalism and worse commentary.  It is padding pure and simple.  I guess it is hard to push out a piece week in week out but Janet this is a fairly drab effort on a very, very important topic.

The real question out of this article is what to do with sub editors who screw up so monumentally in affixing  a clearly wrong banner headline to a piece.

According to a Price Waterhouse Coopers Study even though companies were improving their security risk assessment procedures and spending more on IT security, they were suffering from record levels of security breaches, with incidents double in number what they were two years ago.

The study found that when using new technologies, companies are failing to protect themselves and their information. Most users of cloud computing, it found, do not check that sensitive data stored externally is encrypted.The study found that 34% of companies are critically dependant on externally hosted software used over the internet but that just 17% of companies which host highly confidential data with an external provider ensure that data is encrypted.

Attacks on companies of all sizes have increased, with large companies “bombarded” with activity, compared to a PwC survey two years ago. It found that 62% were infected with malicious software compared to 21% two years ago; 61% have detected a significant attempt to break into their network compared to 31% two years ago; and 25% have suffered a denial of service attack, up from 11%.

The survey found that 92% of large companies encountered some kind of security incident in the last year.

The fact that confidential data stored off-site is not encrypted could be a particular worry for firms. The survey found that while only 15% of security breaches overall were classed as very or extremely serious, 45% of confidential data breaches were serious.

Christopher Hitchens piece Christopher Hitchens re-reads Animal Farm is a delightful, affecting and clear piece on Animal Farm, its context and impact.  Hitchens is an Orwell aficionado and a clear fan.  He has written books about Orwell, Why Orwell matters, and is proudly contrarian.  In the main I am with him as he skewers the pompous and the proud and attacks current orthodoxies which are more about self interest and ideology than logic and reason.  His ferocious atheism is where he loses balance and begins to behave with the self righteousness of those he usually attacks.  But one can forgive him this flaw and the occasional really silly photo piece in Vanity Fair.

Read Animal Farm.  Then read it again.  Once a year at least.

]]> http://www.peteraclarke.com.au/2010/05/02/another-chance-to-admire-orwell/feed/ 0 http://www.peteraclarke.com.au/2010/05/02/principles-governing-grant-of-leave-to-appeal-from-a-discretionary-order-where-the-appeal-proceeds-as-a-hearing-de-novo-non-compliance-with-discovery-orders-re-saeco-australia-pty-ltd-2010-vsc-161/ http://www.peteraclarke.com.au/2010/05/02/principles-governing-grant-of-leave-to-appeal-from-a-discretionary-order-where-the-appeal-proceeds-as-a-hearing-de-novo-non-compliance-with-discovery-orders-re-saeco-australia-pty-ltd-2010-vsc-161/#comments Sun, 02 May 2010 06:50:16 +0000 Peter Clarke http://www.peteraclarke.com.au/?p=698 Making an application to re instate a proceeding which was struck out because of non compliance with court orders is often a grinding experience.  Such applications are generally made in the teeth of vigorous opposition notwithstanding the reluctance of courts to shut out litigants.  The issue in Re Saeco Australia Pty Ltd was whether leave was required on an appeal from the Associate Justice under Rule24.06 and the exercise of discretion.

FACTS

On 11 November 2008, Efthim AsJ dismissed theproceeding on the application of the first defendant (“SIG”) pursuant r 24.02 because of the failure of the plaintiffs to comply with orders of the Court for the discovery of documents.  On 2 December 2009 Efthim AsJ set aside order for dismissal on the plaintiffs’ application made pursuant to r 24.06.   SIG appealed the order made under r 24.06.

Leave required

The Plaintiff argued that SIG needed leave to appeal because the proceedings was under the Corporations Rules and rule 16.5(2) requires leave to appeal a decision of the Associate Justice.  Alternatively because it is a corporations matter even if the appeal was grounded under rule 77, a general right of appeal, because it was  Commercial Court matter leave was required under Rule 77.06(2.1). SIG argued that because the claim was dismissed there was no proceeding under the Corporations Act and the application was at large, hence no leave requirement.  A very technical argument.

Davies J found leave was required but not pursuant to Rule 16.5(2) but under Rule 77.-6(2.1).  The proceeding was a Corporations matter when dismissed.  When it was reinstated it was put back into the Corporations List.

Principles in granting leave

Davies J identified  the key principles in the exercise of discretion regarding the grant of leave as:

1. whether in all the circumstances the decision from which the appeal is brought is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered [7]
2. the Court must be satisfied that there are reasons to grant leave and the Court must exercise its discretion judicially, even though it is not a discretion confined by particular criteria that must be satisfied [8].
3. It is not a sufficient reason to grant leave that an appellate court may have exercised the discretion differently if the matter had come before it at first instance. An appellate court will not normally interfere with a discretionary decision unless the Court can identify some error in the exercise of discretion [8].
4. Where some error in the exercise of discretion can be identified the question of injustice flowing from the order sought to be appealed will generally be an important consideration on the issue of grant of leave, particularly where, as here, the appeal is sought on an interlocutory order [7] & [8]

Davies J found there was no error in the exercise of discretion by Efthim AsJ.    The principles relating to an exercise of discretion to set aside judgment involving non compliance, are those set out in the Court of Appeal decision of Jorgensen v Slater and Gordon. At [14] Davies extracted part of the decision which stated:

The court has a wide discretion to relieve a party of the consequences of non-compliance with a self-executing order. The governing consideration, as in every aspect of practice and procedure, is what justice requires. As Burt CJ said in Link Blocks Pty Ltd v Fullin, all the circumstances must be weighed in the balance and one must not … lose sight of the fact that the justice spoken of is an even-handed justice to [both sides].

The power to relieve must be exercised with care. As Roskill LJ said in Samuels v Linzi Dresses Ltd, it is a power which should be exercised cautiously and with due regard to the necessity for maintaining the principle that orders are made to be complied with and not to be ignored.

………..

We would also adopt what Newnes J said regarding the considerations which should ordinarily be brought to bear in considering the exercise of this discretion. The court should have regard at least to the following matters:

(a) the circumstances in which the self-executing order was made;

(b) the reasons for non-compliance with it;

(c) the prejudice to the defaulting party if relief were not granted; and

(d) the prejudice to the innocent party if relief were granted.

As to the reasons for non-compliance, it is of the first importance to ascertain whether the failure to comply was wilful, that is, was reflective of deliberate disregard of, or indifference to, the court’s order. As Browne-Wilkinson VC said in Re Jokai Tea Holdings Ltd:

The court should not be astute to find excuses for such failure since obedience to orders of the court is the foundation on which its authority is founded. But, if a party can clearly demonstrate that there was no intention to ignore or flout the order and that the failure to obey was due to extraneous circumstances, such failure to obey is not to be treated as contumelious and therefore does not disentitle the litigant to rights which he would otherwise have enjoyed (references omitted).

Davies J focused on the phrase “what justice requires” in Jorgensen stating that the court should involve itself in a broader inquiry when considering the exercise of power under Rule 24.06, reinstating a proceeding [15]. The enquiry is broader than that involved in imposing sanction under Rule 24.02.  SIGs complaint about Efthim AsJ exercise of discretion was that he failed to take into account the time and effort SIG spent in trying to enforce the Plaintiff’s obligation with its discovery obligation, which would not be properly compensated by a costs order.  In that context SIG, not surprisingly, relied on Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University whose principles were applied in Heng v Wang.  In Heng GrayJ stated:

If the powers given by rules of court to give judgment against a defaulting party were never to be exercised, because of a supposed principle that judgment for a large sum of money should not be given without a trial, the grants of express powers by rules would be hollow. Case-management would be deprived of its only real sanction against a party who, while resisting a claim for a substantial sum of money, defaults persistently in complying with orders of a court. … There is no injustice in judgment for a large sum of money against [the appellants], having regard to [the second appellant’s] apparent determination not to comply with repeated orders requiring him to produce for inspection all of the appellants’ discoverable documents

Davies J found the  breaches were not flagrant and while the default resulted in a delay in the timely hearing of the proceeding it was not wilful and was not unduly disruptive of the Court processes.

CONCLUSION

Davies J undertakes a very concise analysis of the rules governing appeals from Associate Justices.  She also considers the grounds for the exercise of discretion.  It is clear from this and other recent decisions that Aon is having a profound effect on civil procedure, not only in relation to amendment to pleadings and adjournment applications but where the issue involves case management and court process.  It is hard to underestimate its continuing impact on civil litigation.

The Federal Attorney General’s response to the Brennan Report is as insipid as the process.  No Charter of Rights, no bill of rights but an Australian Human Rights Framework.  Sounds good.  But less impressive in practice.  It is, in the AG’s words:

Today, in response to the Committee’s report, I am launching Australia’s Human Rights
Framework.
The Framework focuses on:
• reaffirming a commitment to our human rights obligations;
• the importance of human rights education;
• enhancing our domestic and international engagement on human rights issues;
• improving human rights protections, including through greater parliamentary
scrutiny; and
• achieving greater respect for human rights principles within the community.

Sounds good  But no mention of liking puppy dogs and being a big supporter of happy families. But what does it mean beyond the platitudes.

The Framework includes an internal process to vet legislation in light of Human Rights obligations, the AG saying:

The Government will introduce legislation to establish a new Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) which will have representation from both Houses of Parliament. It is envisaged that the new Committee will operate in a similar way to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties.  In particular, it will have the power to initiate inquiries into Bills, existing Acts and delegated legislation as well as conduct broader human rights inquiries.  And it will be empowered to conduct public hearings when the Committee believes it would benefit from submissions from the public or particular expertise.

This will be the first time that we will have, at a Federal level, a parliamentary committee dedicated to human rights scrutiny in such a comprehensive way.

A separate but related measure is the introduction of Statements of Compatibility.  The Government will introduce legislation to require Ministers, when introducing a Bill into Parliament, to present a statement of human rights compatibility. The obligation will also apply to delegated legislation.  Again, compatibility will be assessed against the seven core human rights instruments to which I have referred.

The statements of compatibility will not detract from parliamentary sovereignty.  Rather, they will inform Parliament of human rights considerations to assist its deliberation and ultimate determination of legislative outcomes.

Specifically, the Statements will assist Ministers explain the purpose and intent of the legislation, to contextualise human rights considerations, and where appropriate, justify restrictions or limitations on rights in the interests of other individuals or society more generally.

In turn, by providing information about human rights compatibility, the Statements will assist the parliamentary process and aid the consideration of relevant issues by the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights.

It is a very insipid process driven box ticking exercise.  A bit more work for the Attorney Generals Department but really nothing significant. Legally it means nought.

The usual suspects come out, Bob Carr, resident sceptic at the Australian,  against the Charter of Rights with Three cheers that we won’t have charter of rights and Sara Joseph with a glass half full piece in the Age Stance on human rights has everything – except a charter.  Both are examples of ordinary analysis.  Carr says everything as about as good as it can get today and we all dodged a bullet of “rights fundamentalism”.  The reality is that the legislature flinches from necessary rights based reforms until there is no alternative, sometimes even then that is not enough.  In Australia judges are not given to creating law on the run.  Look at the approach taken by the High Court, even at its most active.  Sara Joseph’s piece is the usual retort to the Carr like commentary.  The point is that a Charter is not going to advance rights. Criticisms from the bench about whether legislation complies or not means little.  The Victorian Government has already worn criticism and batted it away (on knives).

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