In X v Twitter Inc [2017] NSWSC 1300 the Supreme Court of New South Wales, per Pembroke J, issued a final injunction regarding a post on Twitter. In doing so the Court considered in detail the scope and operation of injunctions on Twitter, a platform with much of its operations located outside Australia.

FACTS

Between 16 and 19 May the first offending tweets appeared [6] with the author of the tweets used a twitter handle that falsely adopted the name of the plaintiff’s CEO.

On 19 May, the plaintiff’s solicitors wrote to Twitter Inc:

• drawing attention to the tweets,
• the offending information contained in them and
• the user’s impersonation of the plaintiff’s CEO.
• requesting Twitter Inc to:
  • remove the offending material from the Twitter website;
  • to deactivate the ‘fake’ user’s account;
  • to take all other steps available to it to prevent the user from publishing further confidential information on the Twitter website; and
  • to provide the identity and contact information of the user.

Twitter responded Read the rest of this entry »

The Supreme Court considered an urgent application for an interlucotury injunction in a privacy related matter in Candy v Bauer Media Limited [2013] NSWSC 979. The urgent application was made on 20 July 2013 with the decision made and reasons published that same day.

FACTS

The plaintif, Holly Rachel Candy, is better known in Australia by her Maiden Name, Holly Valance.  Sometime Soapie star who later developed a musical, and occasional movie, career.  Now a celebrity in the UK married to a wealthy businessman.  For those consumers of gossip magazines and celebrity websites this is almost trite.  Nevertheless it is not knowledge that would be regarded as notorious and it does not seem to have made its way into the affidavit material with his Honour stating:

1. The plaintiff is an actress. She is an Australian Read the rest of this entry »

Last Friday, the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Roberts v Investwell Pty Ltd (In liq) [2012] NSWCA 134 considered the operation of equitable charges and mortgages in the context of unfair preferences.

FACTS

In June 2001 the Respondent (“Investwell”) purchased land in Marourabra to develop home units using its own funds, monies advanced from prospective purchasers and a loan from a credit union.  The Appellant (“Roberts”) was a director and shareholder of Investwell [3].  In April 2002 it became apparent that there was a shortfall in funding to complete the project. Roberts entered into an agreement whereby he agreed to use his best endeavours to provide further funds and security for the project [4].  On the sale of units the debt with the credit union was discharged leaving a balance of $164,306.83 which was paid to Roberts on the basis that he was a creditor ( not in issue) of the company in that amount.  It was not in issue that when the payment was made Investwell was insolvent  [6].

An order for the winding up of Investwell was made on 12 March 2007.  Investwell and the liquidator brought proceedings against Roberts claiming money he received was a voidable transaction [7].

The relevant provisions of the agreement are set out at  [9], the most relevant of which was Read the rest of this entry »

Associate Justice Gardiner recently considered applications to set aside statutory demands in Business Structures Pty Ltd v D’Amico (t/a D’Amico Steel Works) [2012] VSC 146 and Alda Constructions Pty Ltd v Car Parking Solutions Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 145.

Business Structures Pty Ltd v D’Amico (t/a D’Amico Steel Works)

Facts

The sum in the demand comprised a judgment plus interest on the judgment.  The demand was not accompanied by an affidavit verifying it pursuant to section 459E(3) of the Corporations Act 2001.  A VCAT order, filed in the Magistrates’ Court pursuant to section 121 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998, is enforceable as a monetary order.  There was  no genuine dispute that the sum the subject of the demand is due and payable [5].

The demand claimed interest from the day after VCAT made the order until the day that the statutory demand was issued.

Decision

Had the demand been Read the rest of this entry »